A checksum (i.e., a cryptographic hash) of a file can be used as an integrity check, if an attacker tries to change the code in an executable file, a checksum can be used to detect the tampering.
Introduction
With the increase in the use of computers, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of desktop applications as well. Because many of these new desktop applications are no longer free, there has also been increase in the breaking of these applications. The so-called "bad guys" in the world of security pursue malicious activities that disrupt the normal flow of productivity.
In 1998 -when virus development was in its early stages -a wide variety of new infection techniques were introduced. Most of these viruses took advantage of PE files, attacking them by adding extra sections to the file or by adding the malicious code to the empty spaces between sections. A PE file is file format for executable or .exe files [6] . An example of this is the Virus.Win32.IKX virus, which would look for gaps in the virtual image of a file and add code in the middle and in the last section. The virus would then change the entry point and fix section headers [15] . Some viruses would add extra sections -like the .text section, where the programmable code is present -and then change the entry point to the newly-added section. Another example of such a virus is Win95.invir.7051 [16] , which would infect those PE files that are opened, renamed or the file attributes are read or set. To infect a file, the virus would encrypt the code and add code to the end of the last section.
One common trait among these viruses is that they add extra malicious code to the already-present code -the attacker would infect the PE file with additional malicious code and use that file to attack the system. However, this infection technique was easy to discover, as there would be suspicious content in each of these virus-infected .exe's.
Hence, virus writers introduced newer techniques to infect files, such as encrypting the suspicious content. Every time application developers added new security features, virus writers would develop a work around for them. One way to increase the security of an application is the checksum, or hash validation the checksum or hash of the file is calculated and then compared to the file. If the attacker tries to change the file by reverseengineering it and adding extra sections, the checksum of the file changes and the validation fails. The code can take appropriate action if it encounters any such abnormality. Another use of checksum is to protect files from modification, for which a checksum of the files is calculated and saved securely. Operating systems use this technique for security. After a regular interval of time, this checksum is recalculated to confirm that these files are not modified or changed. But, this technique is not used for all files, as there are files in a system that change often [17] .
A security feature added by Microsoft in their latest operating systems is Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). ASLR is not a complete security measure, but it provides an enhancement to the present system. ASLR adds a little complexity to the loader, but in return it allows more secure applications. ASLR gives us a general defense mechanism against attacks on memory corruption [18] .
Windows XP and earlier operating systems did not have ASLR, so it was easy for an attacker to intrude into a system. The attacker took advantage of this vulnerability and was able to launch different types of attacks on a PE file. One of the most common attacks was the buffer overflow attack, a kind of anomaly in code that uses buffers to write the data. An executable code is made of three main memories: instruction memory, heap memory, and stack memory. Instruction memory is comprised of executable code.
Stack memory is used to store local variables, buffers, and return addresses. Heap memory is used to store dynamic length data. The stack memory is filled "first in, last
out" -what goes into the stack first comes out last. Since this stack contains function arguments, local variables, and return addresses one over the other, it is very possible to overrun these memory locations if any of the variables or arguments is more than the assigned length. An attacker can take advantage of this architecture and overrun the return address with its malicious code by giving a long input value to the variables or arguments. The attacker can add its malicious code as input at the right location and can therefore gain control over the system [19] . ASLR prevents buffer overflow attacks by loading various parts of an executable on random addresses. Libraries, stack, heap, and executable code, all of them, are loaded into different memory locations [20] .
ASLR has been very helpful in preventing buffer overflow attacks, but is not completely secure enough to prevent them. ASLR loads the executable in any of the memory locations from the 256 available memory spaces, like an attacker can still brute force these addresses until it succeeds. There are also other ways to determine the memory location where an exe is loaded, such as coercing an application to leak one of its addresses -for example, leaking the address of a function inside the dll [21] .
As such, it is important to check the integrity of the executable after it has been loaded, since an attacker could otherwise use any of the methods mentioned above and cause harm to the system. We can check the integrity of an exe by comparing the checksum of the bytes of the programmable code when it has been loaded into memory. Since the addresses are changed every time the executable is loaded, a simple checksum or hash comparison is of no use, as each time the checksum value would be different. The main aim of this project is to calculate the checksum of the loaded executable in such a way that its value is always constant. In order to achieve this, we skip the bytes that would be changed due to ASLR.
Background
There have been many attacks on exe's. 
Attacks on PE files
Attackers have targeted exe files for a long time. In the late 90's, the count of Win32 viruses was relatively small -somewhere in the hundreds -but the growth has been exponential ever since [7] . Virus writers have created different versions of viruses and also different ways to keep them stealthy, but harmful. The most common types of attacks on an exe file are as follows:
1. Appending an extra section: This is the most common technique used by virus writers to infect an exe and get into the system. The attacker attaches an extra section to the last section of an exe file, so that when the exe is run in a system it also runs the malicious code attached in the last section.
2. Changing the entry point: Here, the attacker changes the entry point of an exe to the virus code. This way, when an exe is executed it will take the pointer to the location where virus code is present.
3. Disassembling and patching: Another kind of attack to breach a system's security is to disassemble the exe into assembly code. The attacker can then change the assembly code, for example changing instructions for where the password is verified and then patching it so that the exe can be used without any login or key [7] .
In general, a virus attaches itself to a PE file or by adding a new section to the PE file, and when these executable files are run, it also runs the malicious code. Mostly these viruses infect system executables, as they are running all the time when the system is running -this makes such viruses stealthier. These viruses are also called "cavity viruses"
[17]. Some examples of these include, 2. 5lo Virus [9] : This is also one of the viruses that infect exe files. First discovered in 1992, it would append itself at the end of an exe file and install itself when the exe file is running.
PE File Format
A Portable Executable file (PE File) is an executable file that is used to install any application on the system [6] . A PE file when on disk is an ordinary file, but when loaded into memory it becomes a module, and the file is mapped to that module [2] . A PE file is made of various sections and headers, each of which has a specific purpose. The memory location where this PE file is going to be loaded is defined under these section headers.
Before taking any action on a PE file, the loader parses all the headers and then proceeds to load the file. It also determines how much space should be allotted in the memory. All of this information is stored inside the PE headers. One important thing to note is that a PE file is not mapped to memory as single memory mapped file. Instead, The Windows loader looks into the PE file to decide which portions of file should be mapped. The offset of a file is different from the loaded process. The figure below provides details of this memory mapping.
Figure 1: PE file memory mapping. [13]
Below is a diagram of a PE file. It shows the PE file headers. 
File Headers
A PE file header stores information about the file, such as image size, stack size, and a number of various sections. It also gives information such as whether it is an exe file or a dll. The PE file header is made up of MS-DOS stub, PE Signature, COFF File header, and an Optional Header.
MS-DOS Stub
MS-DOS stub determines that the image file is a valid file and can be run under MS-DOS [1] . The linker triggers the message "This program cannot be run in DOS mode" if the image file is not meant for DOS mode [2] .
Signature
After the MS-DOS stub is a 4-byte signature of the file. This identifies the file as a PEformat image file [2] .
Optional Header
Every image file has this header, and it provides information to the loader. It's called "optional" because some files do not have it, specifically object files. It provides information to the loader that includes the following: 
Section Headers
This 2. Virtual Size: This stores the total size of the section when loaded into memory.
3. Virtual Address: This is the address of the first byte of the section relative to the image base when the section is loaded into memory.
4. Size of Raw Data: This is the size of the initialized data on the disk.
5. Pointer to Raw Data: This is the file pointer to the first page of the section.
6. Pointer to Relocations: This is the file pointer to the beginning of the relocation entries for the section.
7. Pointer to Line Numbers: This is the file that points to the beginning of the linenumber entries for the section.
8. Number of Relocations: This is the number of relocation entries for the section.
9. Number of Line Numbers: This is the number of line-number entries for the section.
10. Characteristics: This field describes the characteristics of the section [2] .
There are also various section flags. Section flags detail the characteristics of a section.
Some of the important flags include, 
Special Sections
Win32 loaders process these special sections and the content of such sections. These sections have flags with some special value, which are understood by the loaders. Some of the reserved sections include, 
ASLR on Windows
Executable images that contain PE headers are eligible for ASLR. This can be done by setting the value of a bit to 0X40 in the PE Header. The option "/dynamicbase" can also be set using Microsoft Visual Studio. A random offset of the global image is selected, which changes only after a reboot. This image offset could be anywhere in the range of 256 locations. ASLR also randomizes the thread stack and process heap. Starting with the stack address, ASLR randomizes the stack address in the range of any of the 32 locations.
After the stack randomization, it also randomizes the process heap in the range of any of the 32 locations. These locations are selected so as not to overwrite the already-placed stack addresses. The starting address of the Process Environment Block (PEB), which is basically the data structure used by the OS, is also a random selection. This technique was present in earlier versions of Windows, including XP.
An experiment further demonstrates this randomness. An ASLR-compatible executable was run several times to measure the randomness. The executable was run for 11,500
times -each time the heap address of the exe was recorded, and then a graph was plotted with this data. As we can see in Figure 4 , there are no noticeable patterns in the uniform distribution of HeapAlloc addresses. The x-axis of the graph is the number of times the program was run, and the y-axis represents the addresses selected by the ASLR while running the program. 
Cryptographic Hash Function
Cryptographic hash function is a technique by which a block of bytes is taken and after a certain number of calculations returns back a fixed size of bytes. A change in even a single bit of the input data changes the final result -i.e., the cryptographic hash value. An ideal candidate for a cryptographic hash function would be one that satisfies the following conditions [11]:
1. It should be easy to calculate the hash value of any kind of bytes given as input.
2. It should not be possible to calculate the input bytes from a given hash -i.e., it should be irreversible. The algorithm of these cryptographic hash functions must be very accurate -even a small vulnerability could lead to an attack. There are many hash functions, but some of the famous and strong functions include MD5, SHA-1, HMAC, and RIPEMD [11] . Because of this change in the instruction bytes the checksum is different, as these exe's will be loaded into a different memory address with a different offset. So, to calculate the checksum, we need to remove these addresses from the bytes for which we need to calculate the checksum or hash value.
We can compare this hash value just before the main execution of the application, and if there is any discrepancy in the hash value or checksum the program can exit its execution. If an attacker breaks into the code and makes changes, this hash validation will fail and the attack will be unsuccessful.
Implementation

PE header Files
The PE header provides information about the exe file when it is running in the memory:
the number of sections, base address, size of code, number of relocations, section which contains the code, path of the original exe, and image base (the preferred location of the exe to be loaded into the memory).
Information after loading the file
Once the PE files have been loaded into memory, our tool will fetch either its entry point or the actual loading memory address. The Windows API has specific functions, such as the Process API and Module API functions provided by Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN) [5] . These functions will help in fetching the data from the process loaded into memory.
Reading the code section
Once the loaded memory address and the size of the .text section have been inferred from the file, the Process API functions provide read access to the whole code section of the memory. This can be used to deduce all the bytes of a process or module.
Computing the hash
The hash value algorithm gathers data from the .text section. The starting address is the entry point of the algorithm, and the hash value algorithm then computes each and every byte until the last memory of the section. For this hash to be accurate, we need to remove all the bytes from the code section that have addresses in them, as these instructions are modified every time the ASLR loads the PE file into memory. This affects the hash value, as it will have different bytes each time. Since these instructions can alter the hash value, before considering the bytes each relocation address is compared to see if it lies between the specific ranges of addresses that are valid for computing the hash value. Finally, the hash is calculated on all the remaining bytes. A detailed description of the algorithm is given in the following section.
Checksum Generator Algorithm
We calculate the cryptographic hash of a running process, as there can be changes in the assembly code of the PE file that is running as compared to a static exe. We consider the .text section of the process, as it contains the programmable code. Each process running in memory has a Process ID, which is the unique ID of each and every process. Once the tool is given an input of the PID it performs calculations on the code section, and the end product is a cryptographic hash of that process. Since the process is running on a system that has ASLR present in it, every time the process is run and the exe is loaded into a different memory address there is a difference in the cryptographic hash value.
The algorithm starts by asking the user about the PID of the process for which the user would like to calculate the hash. When the user provides the PID as input, the tool gets
We check the relocation by looking at the address -if the address is in the range of (image_base) and (image_base + size_of_section), then it has been relocated to a different address, and we do not consider this part of the instruction. This means "[new address]" will be a relocated address. Next, we check if this new address lies in the range of (image_base) and (image_base + size) -if it does not exist in this range we skip this "new address" and put the rest of the bytes in the buffer the checksum of which is to be calculated.
Testing and Results
After creating our checksum generator, the following tests were performed to check the integrity of the generator. We tested it with various exe's, not only against non-system exe's, but also against system exe's like notepad.exe, calc.exe, paint.exe, and so forth.
Below is a detailed description with results of the testing of the checksum generator with non-system and system exe's.
Test on regular PE files
In this section, we check our algorithm with non-system exe's that we created, using the option in Visual Studio 2008 to create an ASLR-compatible exe by enabling the option /dynamicbase. We created a sample "Hello World" program -this program simply prints "Hello World!" and shows as a running process in the task manager.
Test Case 1 -helloworld.exe
First Run As we can see, our checksum generator calculates the hash value for the Hello World application as "0195ac0dff46e8600d98258f7b8fd1d3d" with PID as "7400."
This was the first run of the application. Next, we close the application and restart it so that it has a different PID, and our tool calculates the hash value again. The hash value in the second run should be the same as the hash value in the first run. Also, the PID of the process for the second run should be different from the PID of the process for the first run.
Second Run Figure 6: Second run for Hello World application
For the second run, the cryptographic hash value of the running application helloworld.exe is "0195ac0dff46e8600d98258f7b8fd1d3d" and the PID is "1576."
When we compare the hash values of the same application but for two different iterations, Cryptographic Hash value (first run): 0195ac0dff46e8600d98258f7b8fd1d3d
PID (first run): 7400
Cryptographic Hash value (second run): 0195ac0dff46e8600d98258f7b8fd1d3d
PID (second run): 1576
we can see that both hash values are the same, but the process ID is different for each case.
Similarly, the checksum generator algorithm was tested on various dummy applications, and the result was the same: an identical hash value, but a different process ID number.
Test on System Exe's Test Case 2 -notepad.exe
Another scenario is to test the tool on system exe's, like notepad.exe, paint.exe, or calc.exe. For this test case, we have selected notepad.exe.
First Run
First we opened an empty Notepad file, and then we gave our algorithm an input of the PID of Notepad.
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Figure 7: First run for Notepad application
As we can see, the tool calculates the hash value for the Notepad application as "071d0ecc1ad1d34cbab690fe4d6712032" with a PID of "2388."
Now, as we did earlier, we close the exe and then open it again to get a different process ID.
Second Run
We have the hash values for the first run. Now we can compare them to the values for the second run. Third Run (on a different machine)
Just to be certain that our tool is robust enough and can produce the same result on different platforms, we ran our tool on another system. Below is the screenshot of the result:
Figure 9: Third run for Notepad application
The result from this run is as follows:
Cryptographic Hash value = 071d0ecc1ad1d34cbab690fe4d6712032
PID = 6540
Now we can compare the results from each run. As we can see, the hash values of Notepad for both runs on the same machine are identical. The value is also the same for the third run, which was done on a totally different machine but produced the same result. However, the process ID is different in all cases.
Test Case 3 -Calc.exe
We also ran another test on a system exe file, this time calc.exe.
First Run
Below is the snapshot from the first run: Cryptographic Hash value = 05c15953d6035c5372e333d2743b2b0d0
Process ID = 7144
We ran calc.exe for a second time, and again collected the results. 
Performance Analysis Testing
To check the performance efficiency of the checksum generator, we calculated the checksum of an application both with and without relocation. In the "with relocation"
scenario, the checksum generator skipped the address relocations; in the "without relocation" scenario it did not skip any relocations, which means it calculated the checksum of all the bytes in the .text section. This test was run 10 times on a 32-bit operating system. The figure below shows the time difference between the two algorithms: The x-axis represents the number of times the application was run, and the yaxis represents the execution time taken by the application in milliseconds. As we can see in the graph, the difference between the two algorithms is not enormous -the average time difference between the two algorithms is 0.0101 milliseconds, which is not a very substantial value. So, we can conclude that the checksum generator does not make a meaningful impact on the efficiency of the algorithm. Hence, the percentage of addresses that were relocated for the Hello World application came out to be 1.18%.
We performed the same test on another application, aslr_test.exe; the purpose of this application was simply to print numbers in an increasing order. Percentage of relocation addresses = 1.32%
For checking the robustness of the application we also performed another test, running the anti-debugging of the Hello World application using IDA Pro [24] . During antidebugging we applied various breakpoints in the .text section, and in one of the instructions we changed the name of a register from ESI to EAX. This change was done when the application was running as a process in the memory and was assigned a process ID.
Checksum for normal Hello World = 0195ac0dff46e8600d98258f7b8fd1d3d
Checksum for changed Hello World = 03cb9d9d6401c907a900cf4d306acbbd0
So, as we can see, if there is even a small change in the application, the checksum will change. This is a good thing, as it allows comparison of the checksum at regular intervals -even if an attacker tries to make changes during anti-debugging, we can seize the application.
Testing on different applications
After running three different exe's, we find that the algorithm works fine, and as expected gives the same cryptographic hash values for different process ID's.
To further demonstrate the ability of the algorithm, we ran the checksum generator on additional randomly-selected executables, including both system and non-system files.
The results of the checksum generation are shown below: 
Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that, irrespective of the randomness introduced by ASLR, it is possible to calculate the checksum of a process that is loaded into memory. This checksum will always remain constant regardless of whether the system is rebooted, or even if the checksum generator is run on a different machine. The most important use of this checksum would be to safeguard the integrity of an application. Calculating the checksum while the process is running ensures that there are no changes in the executable code, and it is therefore safe to run the application.
There has always been a war between the so-called "good guys" and "bad guys" of the computing world. The good guys develop something, and the bad guys try to break into it. No matter what the engineering world develops, there will always be a crack or a patch available to counter it. This leads to a loss in labor and money for the good guys.
This tool described in this report is made only to increase the security of software. This is not a foolproof security measure, but it makes the work of an attacker a bit more complicated, and perhaps adds to his frustration. In the end it is just that one bit, which if found and changed can breach security.
Future Work
Future work for this project would lead towards an efficient way to include this checksum generator in an actual application, and then validate the calculated hash value when the application is run. However, this integration of the checksum generator with an application would be of no use if an attacker could make changes in the executable code of the checksum generator itself. As such, future research could be to obfuscate the coding of this generator, so that it is difficult for an attacker to understand the logic behind the checksum generation.
